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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No, 1: Did the trial court act within the scope of its discretion in finding that 
Tom and Lori Fox and Plaintiffs/Appellees Donald and Cindy Hart created a valid mutual 
express easement in the common driveway? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he question of whether or not an easement exists is a 
conclusion of law. However, such a finding [of an easement] is the type of highly fact-
dependent question, with numerous potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge a 
broad measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the given set of 
facts. [An appellate court] therefore overturn[s] the finding of an easement only if [it] 
find[s] that the trial judge's decision exceeded the broad discretion granted." White v. 
Randall, 2007 UT App 45, f 7, 156 P.3d 849 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Moreover, an appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial 
court's finding is reviewed for clear error. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Baglev&Co.. 2008 UT App 105,110, 182 P.3d 417 (quotation omitted). 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court act within the scope of its discretion in finding that, 
in the alternative, the parties have a valid mutual implied easement in the common 
driveway? 
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Standard of Review: "[T]he question of whether or not an easement exists is a 
conclusion of law. However, such a finding [of an easement] is the type of highly fact-
dependent question, with numerous potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge a 
broad measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the given set of 
facts. [An appellate court] therefore overtures] the finding of an easement only if [it] 
find[s] that the trial judge's decision exceeded the broad discretion granted." White, 2007 
UT App 45, at f 7 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, an appellant's 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court's finding is reviewed 
for clear error. Hi-Country Estates, 2008 UT App 105, at ^  10 (quotation omitted). 
Issue No, 3: Did the trial court correctly find that the mutual easement covers the 
common driveway? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact regarding the scope of an 
easement are reviewed "for clear error, granting the district court great deference in its 
review of the evidence." Dansie v. Hi Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 UT App 
149, f 7, 92 P.3d 162. "A trial court's factual finding is deemed 'clearly erroneous' only 
if it is against the clear weight of the evidence." Id (citation omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The Appellees in this case are Donald and Cindy Hart ("the Harts"). The 
Appellants in this case, Glen and Karen Schimmelpfennig ("the Schimmelpfennigs"), are 
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appealing an order of the trial court, which (1) found a valid easement in a common 
driveway located between the parties' respective properties; and (2) entered a permanent 
injunction against the Schimmelpfennigs, preventing them from impeding, restricting, 
obstructing, or limiting the Harts' right to access or use the common driveway. 
The Harts (owners of "Lot 1") and the Schimmelpfennigs (owners of "Lot 2") are 
next-door neighbors. Prior to the Schimmelpfennigs acquiring their lot, it was owned by 
Tom and Lori Fox ("the Foxes"). The Harts and the Foxes, acquaintances, purchased 
their unimproved lots from the same seller on the same day in April of 1994. Prior to the 
purchase, they mutually subdivided the property by determining the location of utilities 
and a common driveway, and by preparing and submitting a minor subdivision plat to the 
City of Farmington for approval. After their purchases, they installed utilities and a 
common driveway and built their homes. 
The common driveway is the subject of this litigation. The property line does not 
run through the exact center of the driveway; in fact, much of the driveway is on the Lot 2 
side of the property line. Notwithstanding that, the Harts and the Foxes both had full 
access and use of the common driveway while they were neighbors. 
In November of 1998, the Foxes sold Lot 2 to the Schimmelpfennigs. The Harts 
and the Schimmelpfennigs continued to both use the common driveway for over seven 
years until the personal relationship between the parties began to deteriorate in 2005. In 
November of 2005, the Harts received a letter from the Schimmelpfennigs' attorney 
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demanding that the Harts cease and desist from using the common driveway because it 
constituted a trespass. The Schimmelpfennigs took other actions to prevent the Harts* use 
of the common driveway, including digging a trench and parking a horse trailer across the 
driveway in front of the trench, effectively blocking the Harts5 access to the gate leading 
to the rear of their property. 
The proceeding below was commenced when the Harts brought an action for 
temporary and permanent injunctive relief, requesting that the court prevent the 
Schimmelpfennigs from interfering with their use of the common driveway. The court 
below entered temporary injunctive relief, and after a trial on the merits, found that the 
Harts had an easement in the common driveway and entered permanent injunctive relief. 
This appeal arises from that ruling. 
IL THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT 
BELOW, 
On May 23, 2006, the Harts commenced the proceeding below by filing a 
Complaint [R. at 1-8] and an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Order to Show Cause, with supporting pleadings [R. at 9-44]. 
On May 24, 2006, the court below granted the Harts5 motion and entered a 
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, [R. at 86-88.] 
On June 13, 2006, the trial court held a preliminary injunction hearing. After 
receiving evidence, the court found that there was irreparable harm to the Harts and 
mutually restrained the parties from interfering in any way with ingress or egress of the 
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common driveway. [R. at 97-98.] A preliminary injunction was prepared and entered on 
July 18,2006. [R. at 115-17.] 
On December 3-4, 2007, the trial court held a bench trial on the matter. During 
the course of the trial, the trial judge personally visited and examined the properties at 
issue. [R. at 255 (22:10-26:4).] The court heard closing arguments on December 7, 
2007 and took the matter under advisement. [R. at 173-76, 206.] 
On December 19, 2007, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, which found that a valid express easement existed in the common 
driveway, or in the alternative, a valid easement by implication existed in the common 
driveway. The court further made the preliminary injunction permanent and awarded the 
Harts their costs. [R. at 241-47.] 
On January 16, 2008, the Schimmelpfennigs filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing 
the trial court's December 19, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
[R. at 250-51.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellees Donald and Cindy Hart are the owners and residents of real 
property located at 367 S. 1100 W., Farmington, Utah ("Lot 1"). [R. at 248, White 
Exhibit Binder, Tab 2.]1 
^he Harts refer to their trial exhibit binder (white) and the Schimmelpfennigs' trial 
exhibit binder (red) because the court below apparently did not number the exhibits with the rest 
of the record in this case. However, the record at page 248 does contain a list of the exhibits that 
were received at trial. 
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2. Appellants Glen and Karen Schimmelpfennig are the owners and residents 
of real property located at 387 S. 1100 W., Farmington, Utah{"Lot T). [R. at 248, Red 
Exhibit Binder, Tab 2.] 
3. Prior to April 18, 1994, the real property now known as Lot 1 and Lot 2 was 
owned by Jeffrey and Tracy Hansen ("the Hansens"). [R. at 248, Red Exhibit Binder, 
Tab 2.] 
4. In early 1994, the Harts were looking for property to purchase together with 
Mr. Hart's co-worker, Tom Fox, and his wife Lori ("the Foxes"). [R. at 255 (34:4-35:7).] 
5. In February of 1994, the Harts and the Foxes met with Jeffrey Hansen and 
determined to buy the Hansens' property and split it between them. [Id.] 
6. Before acquiring the property, the Harts and the Foxes mutually 
commenced the work of surveying the property [R. at 255 (36:18-37:9).], subdividing the 
property into two pieces [R. at 255 (40:12-18).], determining, creating, and laying out the 
location of the common utilities and common driveway [R. at 255 (50:13-51:17).], and 
submitting a subdivision plat to the City of Farmington for approval [R. at 255 (44:1-11; 
133:10-16).] 
7. The Harts and the Foxes agreed to share and jointly install utilities, 
including telephone service, sewer service, and secondary and culinary water service. [R. 
at 255 (42:10-25; 68:1-13; 111:5-12).] 
8. The Harts and the Foxes also agreed to share a common driveway located 
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between their properties. [R. at 255 (51:4-52:23; 111:5-12; 122:14-21).] 
9. The subdivision plat submitted to the City of Farmington for approval ("the 
Plat") showed a "Proposed 40' Foot Easement With Access Road" running down the 
property line between Lot 1 and Lot 2, with 20 feet of the designated area on either side 
of the property line. [R. at 248, White Exhibit Binder, Tab 1 (also attached to Aplt. Brief 
at Tab 5).] 
10. When Mr. Hart first viewed the property, there was a dirt vehicle road or 
trail down the middle of the property, from the front of the property to the back of the 
property. [R. at 255 (55:1-10; 100:25-101:15).] 
11. Prior to their purchase of the property, the Harts and the Foxes used the trail 
to access the property from 1100 West, which runs in front of the property. [R. at 255 
(137:20-138:16).] 
12. In March of 1994, prior to their purchase of Lot 1, the Harts got permission 
from the Hansens to put up a fence and keep their horses on the rear of the property. [R. 
at 255 (54:4-55:5).] They used the trail on a daily basis to feed and take care of the 
horses. [R. at 255 (174:20-175:25).] 
13. On April 18, 1994, the Hansens transferred Lot 1 to the Harts and Lot 2 to 
Tom and Lori Fox ("the Foxes"). [R. at 248, White Exhibit Binder, Tab 2-3.] 
14. On May 31,1994, the City of Farmington approved the Plat submitted by 
the Harts and the Foxes. [R. at 248, White Exhibit Binder, Tab 1 (also attached to Aplt. 
7 
BriefatTab5).] 
15. On May 31, 1994, the Harts and the Foxes also obtained building permits so 
that they could build homes on the lots. [R. at 248, Red Exhibit Binder, Tab 3.] 
16. During construction of their homes, the Harts and the Foxes brought fill 
material onto the property to put on the building pads and to build an access road back to 
where the homes were being built. [R. at 255 (165:1-7),] 
17. In building the access road with the fill, they used the existing trail path. [R. 
at 255 (165:8-22).] 
18. The access road was built "somewhat down the middle of the property 
lines" because that's where the common driveway was going. [R. at 255 (149:17-25).] 
19. In November or December of 1994, the Harts and the Foxes put in the 
permanent common driveway. [R. at 255 (151:10-15).] 
20. Mr. Fox himself personally did the asphalting. [R. at 255 (168:11-18).] 
Rather than take measurements to put the permanent common driveway exactly down the 
property line as they had previously agreed, with the consent of Mr. Hart, he simply paved 
the already-existing access road with asphalt. [R. at 255 (151:5-154:3; 164:1-15).] 
21. Mr. Hart and Mr. Fox agreed on the asphalting of the common driveway in 
its present location [R. at 242; 255 (164:11-15)] because of circumstances including (1) 
the fact that "it was getting to be late fall" and they wanted to get it paved quickly [R. at 
255 (151:10-15)]; (2) the fact that they were in a hurry and did not take the time to survey 
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or measure it [R. at 255 (152:8-15; 163:24-164:2)]; (3) the fact that there was already fill 
in the location of the existing access road [R. at 255 (153:25-154:3)]; and (4) "aesthetic" 
reasons [R. at 10; 242]. 
22. The permanent paved common driveway ended up in more or less the same 
location as the dirt trail. [R. at 255 (55:1-10; 113:13-17).] 
23. The Harts and the Foxes also installed common utility lines. To reach both 
houses, the sewer line and the phone line were run across the Harts property (Lot 1). [R. 
at 255 (68:25-69:20).] To reach both houses, the secondary and culinary water lines were 
run across the Foxes' property (Lot 2). [R. at 255 (70:2-12; 128:7-18).] 
24. The Harts and the Foxes used the common driveway and utility lines 
regularly and continuously from the time they were installed. [R. at 242; 255 (179:12-
17).] 
25. The Harts and the Foxes jointly maintained the common driveway. [R. at 
11; 242; 256 (89:5-11).] 
26. The Harts subsequently made improvements on their side of the common 
driveway. Specifically, they put in a pasture, a sprinkling system, a garden shed, a shop, a 
storm drain, a retention pond, a concrete pad, trees, grass, landscaping, and fencing. [R. at 
242; 255 (63:19-65:18; 176:16-178:19); 248, White Exhibit Binder, Tab 6 [pictures]).] 
27. In early 1999, the Schimmelpfennigs offered to purchase Lot 2 from the 
Foxes. [R. at 255 (141:7-23).] 
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28. Prior to purchasing Lot 2, the Schimmelpfennigs met with the Foxes on two 
or three different occasions to look at the whole of the property. [R. at 255 
(142:14-143:17).] 
29. During those meetings, Mr. Fox discussed with Mr. Schimmelpfennig the 
existence and location of the property line, easement, and utilities. [R. at 255 
(143:18-144:17).] 
30. At no point before their purchase of Lot 2 did the Schimmelpfennigs 
inquire of the Harts as to the easement or the Harts' interest in the common driveway. [R. 
at 256 (87:6-88:18); 257 (5:13-6:12).] 
31. On March 12, 1999, the Foxes transferred Lot 2 to the Schimmelpfennigs. 
[R. at 248, Red Exhibit Binder, Tab 2.] 
32. After the Schimmelpfennigs' purchase of Lot 2, the Harts and the 
Schimmelpfennigs jointly maintained and enjoyed the common driveway until 
approximately 2005. [R. at 11; 242.] 
33. In the latter part of 2005, the Schimmelpfennigs had their property surveyed 
and the property line marked with green paint. [R. at 256 (13:18-14:21); 248, Red 
Exhibit Binder, Tab 5, pictures 3-7.] 
34. On November 11, 2005, counsel for the Schimmelpfennigs sent the Harts a 
letter demanding that they cease and desist using the common driveway, claiming that 
"80% or more" of the common driveway was on the Schimmelpfennigs' property. [R. at 
10 
14.] 
35. On May 20-21, 2006, the Harts observed the ScMmmelpfennigs digging a 
two- to three-foot deep trench along the boundary between Lot 1 and Lot 2. [R. at 11; 
248, Red Exhibit Binder, Tab 5, pictures 8-9.] 
36. The Harts later found that the Schimmelpfennigs had parked an unused 
horse trailer across the common driveway in front of the trench, effectively blocking all 
access to the gate that the Harts use to access the rear of their property. [R. at 12; 248, 
White Exhibit Binder, Tab 6, picture "E."] 
37. The Schimmelpfennigs stated their intention to extend the trench all the way 
down the common driveway and to build a wall or a fence to prevent the Harts from 
accessing the common driveway. [R. at 12.] 
38. The Harts investigated the possibility of installing their own driveway; 
however, the cost for re-contouring and re-landscaping their land would exceed $20,000 
and would require them, at a minimum, to remove their retaining pond and/or their fence 
and install a new driveway. [R. at l l 2 ; 245; 255 (95:8-97:10).] 
39. On May 23, 2006, the Harts initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint 
seeking an injunction prohibiting the Schimmelpfennigs from interfering with the use of 
2
 Although some of this evidence was not introduced at trial, it is properly considered 
under Rule 65A(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "any evidence 
received upon an application for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible at the trial 
on the merits becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated at the trial." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65A(a)(2). 
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their easement in the common driveway. [R. at 1-88.] 
40. On May 24, 2006, the court below granted the Harts' motion for a 
temporary restraining order. [R. at 86-88.] 
41. On June 13, 2006, after a hearing, the trial court found that there was 
irreparable harm to the Harts and mutually restrained the parties from interfering in any 
way with ingress or egress of the common driveway. [R. at 97-98.] A preliminary 
injunction was prepared and entered on July 18, 2006. [R. at 115-17.] 
42. A bench trial was held on December 3, 4, and 7, 2007. [R. at 255-57.] 
During the course of the trial, the trial judge personally visited and examined the 
properties at issue. [R. at 255 (22:10-26:4).] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court acted within the scope of its discretion in finding there to be 
a valid express easement in the common driveway. 
A. The parties' oral agreement to create an easement qualified as an 
exception to the statute of frauds because the evidence showed (1) that there was such an 
agreement, (2) that there had been part or full performance of the agreement, and (3) that 
there was reliance thereon. In attacking the trial court's underlying factual findings, the 
Schimmelpfennigs have failed to marshal all of the evidence, and this Court can affirm on 
that ground alone. Even if the Schimmelpfennigs had properly marshaled the evidence, 
there is nonetheless sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings, and the 
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Schimmelpfennigs have failed to demonstrate clear error. In the alternative, this Court 
could find that the Plat prepared and submitted by the parties constituted a "writing" 
within the meaning of the statute of frauds. 
B. The parties agreed that the common driveway be in its present 
location. The Schimmelpfennigs again have failed to marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's finding as to the parties5 intent. Even if they had properly 
marshaled the evidence, they have not demonstrated clear error with regard to the trial 
court's finding. 
C. The express easement is supported by consideration because it is a 
mutual easement. This Court need not second-guess the adequacy of the consideration 
because it is legally sufficient. 
2. The trial court acted within the scope of its discrelion in finding there to be 
a valid implied easement in the common driveway. The evidence at trial demonstrated, 
and trial court found, that (1) unity of title in the two lots at issue was followed by 
severance; (2) the servitude, in the form of a dirt trail, was apparent, obvious, and visible 
at the time of severance; (3) the easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of 
the dominant estate; and (4) the use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. 
The Schimmelpfennigs have failed to demonstrate clear error with respect to the trial 
court's findings. 
3. The trial court's finding that the scope of the easement coincides with the 
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location of the driveway was not clearly erroneous. The Schimmelpfennigs have not 
adequately briefed their argument, and therefore, this Court need not address it. 
However, in any event, the Schimmelpfennigs have failed to demonstrate clear error with 
respect to the trial court's findings regarding the scope of the easement. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS 
DISCRETION IN FINDING THERE TO BE A VALID EXPRESS 
EASEMENT IN THE COMMON DRIVEWAY. 
The trial court below found that the Harts and the Foxes created an express mutual 
easement in the common driveway between their properties. On appeal, the 
Schimmelpfennigs argue that the trial court erred in making this determination. 
"[T]he question of whether or not an easement exists is a conclusion of law. 
However, such a finding [of an easement] is the type of highly fact-dependent question, 
with numerous potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge a broad measure of 
discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the given set of facts." White v. 
Randall, 2007 UT App 45,^ f 7, 156P.3d 849 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
This Court should not overturn the finding of an easement unless it "find[s] that the trial 
judge's decision exceeded the broad discretion granted." Id 
This Court has acknowledged that "there are no specific requirements for the 
creation of an express easement." See Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, f 9, 977 P.2d 
533. However, in determining whether there is a valid easement, Utah courts generally 
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look at the intent of the parties to create an easement, the definileness of the conveyance, 
and whether the parties mutually assented to the easement. Id. (citing Green v. Stansfield, 
886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct App. 1994)). 
The trial court below looked at these elements in determining that there was a valid 
express easement. Specifically, the trial court found that "[tjhere was a meeting of the 
minds between the Foxes and [the Harts] that: (1) the homes share a common driveway; 
and (2) the driveway be where the current driveway is." [R. at 242.] The trial court 
further found that the Schimmelpfennigs purchased Lot 2 with aictual knowledge of the 
easement and therefore were bound by it.3 [R. at 244.] 
The Schimmelpfennigs make several arguments in support of their contention that 
the trial court erred in finding a valid express easement. In essence, they argue that (1) 
the express easement does not satisfy the statute of frauds (see Aplt. Brief at 10-13, 
21-25); (2) the Foxes and the Harts did not intend for the driveway to be where the 
current driveway is (see Aplt. Brief at 13-20); and (3) there was no consideration for the 
easement (see Aplt. Brief at 21-22). These arguments all fail. 
A, The Express Easement Satisfies the Statute of Frauds. 
Because express easements involve real property interests, they must satisfy the 
statute of frauds. Evans v. Board of County Com'rs of Utah County, 2004 UT App 256, f 
9, 97 P.3d 697. To comply with the statute of frauds, "[a]ll that is required is that the 
3The Schimmelpfennigs do not appeal this finding. 
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interest be granted or declared by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged." Id. 
(citing Smith v. Osguthorpe. 2002 UT App 361, f 24, 58 P.3d 854). 
However, as the trial court noted below, "even an oral agreement can suffice to 
create an express easement." [R. at 243.] Indeed, in discussing an express easement, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that 
[i]t is clear . . . that a verbal agreement to transfer an interest in land can be 
taken out of the statute of frauds, and that one can be estopped from 
challenging the oral agreement if three requirements are met: A court must 
find (1) that there was such an agreement, (2) that there had been part or 
fiill performance, and (3) that there was reliance thereon. 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1259 (Utah 1998): see also Green. 886 P.2d at 122. 
A review of the trial court's Findings of Fact demonstrates that these requirements 
were met. In determining that "there was such an agreement," the trial court found that 
"the actual location of the driveway was jointly chosen"and that "[t]here was a meeting of 
the minds between the Foxes and [the Harts] that: (1) the homes share a common 
driveway; and (2) the driveway be where the current driveway is." [R. at 242.] 
The trial court also made findings demonstrating that there had been part or full 
performance of the agreement. Specifically, it found that "Tom Fox . . . installed the 
driveway himself," that "[the Harts] and [the] Foxes jointly maintained and enjoyed the 
driveway and joint lines until the Foxes sold [Lot 2] to [the Schimmelpfennigs] in March 
1999," and that "[the Harts] and [the Schimmelpfennigs] jointly maintained and enjoyed 
the driveway and lines until 2005." [Id.] 
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Finally, as to reliance, the trial court found that "the [parties] jointly maintained 
and enjoyed the driveway and lines" and that "[the Harts] have improved their side of the 
driveway with fencing, berms, trees, and other landscaping." [Id.] 
The Schimmelpfennigs acknowledge the test set forth in Orton for a verbal 
agreement (see Aplt. Brief at 23-24), but attack the findings of the trial court, arguing 
that "there is not sufficient evidence to remove an oral agreement, if there is one, from the 
statute of frauds" in this case (see Aplt Brief at 25). Specifically, the Schimmelpfennigs 
argue that there is not sufficient evidence that there was an agreement between the Harts 
and the Foxes, and that if there was an agreement, it was not performed according to its 
terms. (See Aplt Brief at 24-25.)4 
"When an appellant is essentially challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence, 
a clearly erroneous standard of appellate review applies." Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Baglev & Co.. 2008 UT App 105, f 10, 182 P.3d 417 (quotation 
omitted). This Court therefore "review[s] the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's findings and affirm[s] if there is a reasonable basis for doing so." Id 
L The Appellants have failed to marshal all of the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings. 
As a preliminary issue, the Schimmelpfennigs have failed to marshal all of the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact. It is well-settled law in Utah that 
4The Schimmelpfennigs do not attack the trial court's finding as to reliance, the third 
element of the Orton test. 
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when appealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty to 
marshal the evidence. This duty requires an appellant to marshal all of the 
facts used to support the trial court's finding and then show that these facts 
cannot possibly support the conclusion reached by the trial court, even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee. An appellant may not 
simply cite to the evidence which supports his or her position and hope to 
prevail. Furthermore, failing to properly marshal is sufficient ground for 
affirming the trial court's finding. 
Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, % 9, 144 P.3d 1147. Indeed, this Court has noted that 
the elements underscoring the existence of an easement are factual, and that an 
appellant's failure to properly appeal the factual findings leaves this Court with no choice 
but to "assume that [the trial court's factual findings] are correct and proceed to a review 
of the trial court's legal conclusions." Boyington v. Glenn, 2002 UT App 194, 2002 WL 
1225548. 
In arguing against the trial court's findings, the Schimmelpfennigs spend five and 
a half pages of their brief selectively quoting from the trial transcripts. (See Aplt. Brief at 
14-19.) Although they later make some attempt in their brief to marshal the evidence in 
favor of the Harts (see Aplt. Brief at 35), they neglect to include key pieces of evidence in 
favor of the Harts, and then they once again merely argue their version of the facts and 
evidence (see Aplt. Brief at 36-37). The Schimmelpfennigs do not mention the following 
critical evidence from the testimony of Mr. Fox, which supports the trial court's finding 
that there was an agreement between the Harts and the Foxes as to the common driveway 
easement and its location, and that the agreement had been performed: 
• Mr. Fox testified that he and Mr. Hart had agreed on having a single 
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driveway for both properties. [R. at 255 (122:14-21).] 
• Mr. Fox testified that he and Mr. Hart hauled in imported fill to build up a 
strip of road for access to the homes under construction, and that they put 
that fill "somewhat down the middle of the property lines," "where the road 
was going." [R. at 255 (149:6-25).] 
• Mr. Fox testified that he personally paved the common driveway in its 
current location, which was where the fill had previously been put. [R. at 
255(168:11-18; 153:25-154:3).] 
• Mr. Fox testified that he and Mr. Hart had agreed to the asphalting of the 
common driveway in its current location. [R. at 255 (164:11-15).] 
This evidence certainly supports the trial court's findings. Because the 
Schimmelpfennigs failed to properly marshal the evidence, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's decision. Wayment 2006 UT 56, at f^ 9 ("[F]ailing to properly marshal is 
sufficient ground for affirming the trial court's finding."). 
2, The trial court had sufficient evidence to make its findings. 
Even if the Schimmelpfennigs had properly marshaled the evidence, it is clear that 
the trial court had sufficient evidence to make its findings. 
a. There was an agreement. 
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Fox, as discussed above, the trial court had 
before it the Plat that the Harts and the Foxes jointly submitted to Farmington City, which 
indicated that an "access road" would be placed within the utility easement. [R. at 248, 
White Exhibit Binder, Tab 1 (also attached to Aplt. Brief at Tab 5).] The trial court also 
had before it the testimony of Mr. Hart that he and Mr. Fox had an agreement to build a 
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single common driveway and that they discussed and determined its location and size. 
[R. at 255 (51:4-52:23).] 
Furthermore, and importantly, the court had the testimony of Mr. Hart and Mr. Fox 
that although they originally had intended to put the common driveway exactly over the 
property line, they ultimately agreed to forego measuring and simply pave the existing 
access road. [R. at 255 (168:11-18; 150:25-151:15; 153:25-154:3; 164:11-15; 67:21-23; 
100:8-12).] The Schimmelpfennigs take liberties with this evidence, claiming that Mr. 
Fox "believed that the asphalt poured over the access road was located equally" on the 
two properties, "but later found out that was not correct." (Aplt. Brief at 3.) This is not 
supported anywhere in the record. On the contrary, the record supports the conclusion that 
the parties modified their original agreement—by deciding to simply asphalt the existing 
access road—because of circumstances including (1) the fact that "it was getting to be 
late fall" and they wanted to get it paved quickly [R. at 255 (151:10-15)]; (2) the fact that 
they were in a hurry and did not take the time to survey or measure it [R. at 255 (152:8-
15; 163:24-164:2)]; (3) the fact that there was already fill in the location of the existing 
access road [R. at 255 (153:25-154:3)]; and (4) "aesthetic" reasons [R. at 10; 242]. 
While the trial court focused on the parties' final agreement, the 
Schimmelpfennigs focus their argument on the parties' original understanding, and ignore 
the fact that it was modified. Like any agreement, a modification to an agreement can be 
taken out of the statute of frauds. "If a party has changed his position by performing an 
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oral modification so that it would be inequitable to permit the other party to found a claim 
upon the original agreement^] ... the modified agreement should be held valid." Fisher v. 
Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). As noted 
above, the trial court had sufficient evidence to conclude that the Harts had performed the 
modified agreement and relied on it by "improving] their side of the common driveway 
with fencing, berms, trees, and other landscaping." [R. at 242.] It would therefore be 
inequitable for the Schimmelpfennigs, who were not even parties to the original 
agreement, to found a claim upon it. 
The Schimmelpfennigs5 attempt to confuse both the trial court and this Court by 
ignoring the progression and true nature of the parties' agreement is to no avail. The 
modified and final agreement (as found by the trial court) between the parties was an 
agreement. 
b. There had been performance of the agreement. 
In addition, the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to show that there had 
been performance of the agreement to create an easement. As noted above, Mr. Fox 
testified that he personally paved the common driveway in its current location. [R. at 255 
(168:11-15).] Furthermore, there was evidence that the Harts and Foxes had jointly 
maintained and enjoyed the common driveway up until the time that the Foxes sold Lot 2 
to the Schimmelpfennigs. [R. at 242; 256 (88:19-89:9).] 
Despite this evidence of an agreement and performance of the agreement, the 
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Schimmelpfennigs argue that it is insufficient. Once again focusing on the parties' 
original understanding, they point to Mr. Fox's testimony that the common driveway was 
supposed to lie equally on each side of the property line and that he did not agree as to 
how the common driveway is currently put in. (See Aplt. Brief at 14-15 [quoting R. at 
255 (122:14-123:9)].) However, this testimony is inconsistent with Mr. Fox's later 
testimony that he did ultimately agree as to the location of the common driveway [R. at 
255 (164:11-15)] and that he himself paved the common driveway in its current location 
[R. at 255 (168:11-15)]. 
Where a trial court is presented with inconsistent or conflicting evidence, it 
necessarily must rely on credibility determinations. Lefavi v. Bertocbu 2000 UT App 5, f 
20, 994 P.2d 817; see also Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990) 
(finding that trial court apparently chose not to rely on certain questionable testimony in 
making its findings of fact, and that such a credibility determination was a proper task for 
the trial court). Indeed, "[t]he trial court is cin the best position to assess the credibility of 
witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate 
court cannot hope to gamer from a cold record."5 Lefavi, 2000 UT App 5, at ^ 20 
(quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
In this case, the trial court apparently credited the testimony of Mr. Hart and the 
later testimony of Mr. Fox in determining that the parties had agreed as to the creation 
and location of a common driveway easement. Indeed, it would have been difficult for 
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the trial court to have found that Mr. Fox did not agree and concede to the location of the 
common driveway, given that he is the one who actually paved it. 
The Schimmelpfennigs have not shown that the trial court's findings of fact 
underlying its legal conclusion are clearly erroneous. The trial court did not exceed its 
broad discretion in applying its findings of fact to the law in determining that the parties' 
oral agreement created an express easement. This Court should find that the requirements 
for finding an express easement through an oral agreement have been met and affirm the 
trial court's decision. 
3. Alternatively, there was a writing that satisfied the statute of frauds. 
In the alternative, this Court can affirm the ruling of the trial court on other 
grounds not cited by the trial court by finding that there was a writing that satisfied the 
statute of frauds. "[I]t is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment 
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, 
even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the 
basis of its ruling or action." Dipoma v. McPhie. 2001 UT 61,1f 18, 29 P.3d 1225 
(internal quotations omitted). 
As noted above, to comply with the statute of frauds, "[a]ll that is required is that 
the interest be granted or declared by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged." 
Evans. 2004 UT App 256, at % 9. Although generally such a writing is a deed, a deed is 
not necessary. Id In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has previously found the existence of 
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a private easement in a road based on a plat map showing the road. See Carrier v. 
Lindquist 2001 UT 105, ffl[ 12-13, 37 P.3d 1112. 
In this case, the Harts and the Foxes jointly created a Plat to submit to the City of 
Farmington. The Plat depicts an area encompassing 20 feet on each side of the property 
line, which area is designated "Proposed 40f Wide Utility Easement and Access Road." 
[R. at 248, White Exhibit Binder, Tab 1 (also attached to Aplt. Brief at Tab 5).] At trial, 
Mr. Fox, the party to be charged, testified that he and Mr. Hart agreed as to the Plat. [R. at 
255 (132:10-133:16).] The Plat qualifies as a writing that complies with the statute of 
frauds. 
Although it is clear that the final location of the common driveway was different 
than indicated on the Plat, this is not critical to the analysis. As noted above, the 
subsequent oral modification is outside of the statute of frauds and therefore also 
enforceable. 
Thus, this Court can find that there was an express written easement and oral 
modification that complied with the statute of frauds, or in the alternative, the Court can 
find that although the easement is based on an oral agreement, the Plat is a sufficient 
writing to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
B. The Intent of the Parties Supports the Finding of a Valid Express 
Easement. 
The Schimmelpfennigs next argue that the Harts and the Foxes did not intend for 
the common driveway to be substantially on Lot 2. (See Aplt. Brief at 13-20.) This is 
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similar to their argument, addressed above, that there was no agreement for the creation 
of an easement. The trial court found that it was clear that [the Harts] and the Foxes 
intended to build a common driveway. [R. at 243.] Furthermore, as noted supra, the trial 
court found that "[t]here was a meeting of the minds between the Foxes and [the Harts] 
that: (1) the homes share a common driveway; and (2) the driveway be where the current 
driveway is." [R. at 242.] 
The trial court's findings as to the parties' intent are questions of fact that are 
reviewed for clear error. Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, ^ 10, 121 P.3d 57. As 
discussed above, the Schimmelpfennigs have failed to properly marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings of fact as to the intent of the Harts and the Foxes, and 
this Court may affirm on that basis alone. (See Part LA. 1, supra.) 
Even if the Schimmelpfennigs had properly marshaled the evidence, however, they 
have not demonstrated clear error. There can be no question that the Harts and the Foxes 
intended to share a common driveway. Indeed, the Schimmelpfennigs concede that point 
in their brief. (See Aplt. Brief at 7, 13.) Certainly, there is evidence (as the 
Schimmelpfennigs point out) that the Harts and the Foxes originally intended for the 
common driveway and easement to lie exactly on the property line. However, the 
Schimmelpfennigs ignore the evidence as to what the Harts and the Foxes ultimately 
decided with regards to the location of the common driveway. The evidence 
demonstrated that, without measuring, the Harts and the Foxes mutually decided to pave 
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the driveway in the location of the then-existing access road [R. at 255 (168:11-18; 
153:25-154:3; 164:11-15; 67:21-23; 100:8-12).] The evidence demonstrates that the 
common driveway was, in fact, paved, and that Mr. Fox did the paving. [R. at 255 
(168:11-18).] 
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, it is 
clear that those findings—that the parties intended to share a common driveway and 
agreed that the driveway be where the current driveway is—are reasonable and should be 
affirmed. 
C. The Express Easement Is Supported by Consideration, 
Next, the Schimmelpfennigs argue that the express easement is not valid because it 
was not supported by consideration. [See Aplt. Brief at 21-22.] Their argument ignores 
the fact that the easement is a mutual easement. 
As the trial court correctly noted, the consideration for a mutual easement is the 
reciprocal agreement itself. [R. at 243.] Indeed, in a similar case involving a common 
driveway, the Utah Supreme Court found that there was consideration for a mutual 
easement where each owner agreed to give to the other a portion of his property for use in 
the common driveway. Orton, 970 P.2d at 1260. 
In this case, the easement is mutual. The Harts and the Foxes each agreed to give 
the other use of a portion of their property so that a common driveway could be built. 
Thus, not only do the Harts have an easement in the Schimmelpfennigs5 property, but the 
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Schimmelpfennigs have an easement in the Harts' property. There is no question that the 
common driveway is located on both sides of the property line. [R. at 248, Red Exhibit 
Binder, Tab 5, pictures 3-7.] Thus, the trial court correctly found that there was 
consideration for the mutual express easement. 
The Schimmelpfennigs attempt to argue that because more of the common 
driveway is on their property, "it cannot be concluded that [they] received consideration 
by use of [the Harts'] property." [See Aplt. Brief at 22.] There are several problems with 
this argument, which is wholly unsupported by any authority in their brief. 
First, the Schimmelpfennigs' receipt of any consideration is irrelevant. They, of 
course, were not parties to the agreement creating the mutual express easement. The 
issue is whether the Foxes received consideration for the easement. 
Second, neither the trial court nor this Court should have to second-guess the 
benefits of the contracting parties' bargain. Indeed, "[o]rdinarily, courts will not inquire 
into the adequacy of consideration unless it is so insufficient or illusory as to render 
enforcement of the contract unconscionable." Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, f^ 27, 984 
P.2d 987;5 see also Cole v. Parker, 300 P.2d 623, 626 (Utah 1956) (finding that where the 
parties are competent to contract and there is no fiduciary relationship, "the court will not 
inquire into the adequacy of consideration if it is legally sufficient"). As the trial court 
noted, to "undo the agreement of the parties would be to frustrate their freedom to 
5At no point during this litigation have the Schimmelpfennigs claimed that the express 
easement agreement was unconscionable. 
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contract with one another about how they will jointly use their respective property." [R. 
at 243.] 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding that there was 
legally sufficient consideration for the creation of the express easement in the common 
driveway. 
Because the express easement does not violate the statute of frauds, is supported 
by the intent of the Harts and the Foxes, and is supported by consideration, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's decision that there is a valid express easement in the 
common driveway. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS 
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THERE IS A 
VALID EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION IN THE COMMON DRIVEWAY, 
The trial court below found that, in the alternative, the Harts and the Foxes created 
a valid easement by implication in the common driveway between their properties. On 
appeal, the Schimmelpfennigs argue that the trial court erred in making this 
determination. 
As noted above, although the existence of an easement is a question of law, it is a 
"highly fact-dependent question, with numerous potential fact patterns, which accords the 
trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the 
given set of facts." White v. Randall 2007 UT App 45, f 7, 156 P.3d 849 (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
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This Court has held that the elements of an easement by implication are as follows: 
(1) that unity of title was followed by severance; (2) that the servitude was 
apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of severance; (3) that the 
easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; 
and (4) that the use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. 
Butler v.Lee. 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This Court should not overturn 
the factual findings of the trial court regarding these elements unless "the findings ... are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the [Court] otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." IcL 
A. There Was Unity of Title in the Lots, Followed by Severance. 
The trial court found that there had existed unity of title in the two lots, followed 
by severance. Specifically, the court below found that the Hansens had previously owned 
the property comprising both of the lots at the same time. [R. at 244.] The trial court also 
found that subsequently, on April 18, 1994, the Hansens severed the unity of title by 
conveying the two lots to the Harts and the Foxes. [Id.] 
The Schimmelpfennigs do not appear to dispute that the Hansens simultaneously 
owned the property comprising both of the lots (see Aplt. Brief at 5, 26-27)6; rather, they 
seem to argue that there was no unity of title because the Hansens held the property as 
separate parcels, not a "unified" parcel, and/or because neither the Harts nor the Foxes 
6As the trial court noted, it was the Schimmelpfennigs' own exhibit (see 'Time Line and 
Deed Summary," attached as Tab 2 to Aplt. Brief) that conclusively demonstrated that the 
Hansens had simultaneously owned the property comprising both of the lots at issue in this case. 
[R. at 244, 248, Red Exhibit Book, Tab 2.] 
29 
ever had unity of title (see id.). These arguments reflect a misunderstanding of what is 
meant by "unity of title." 
"Unity of title" simply means simultaneous common ownership by some person or 
entity. There is no requirement that the property under common ownership be a single 
parcel, as the Schimmelpfennigs seem to suggest in their brief. See, e.g., Butler v. Lee, 
774 P.2d at 1152 (finding unity of title where there was common ownership of distinct 
parcels). In fact, courts in other jurisdictions have expressly rejected that argument. See, 
e.g., Hurlocker v.Medina, 878 P.2d 348, 351 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) ("[U]nity of title . . . 
does not require the dominant and servient estates be carved out of a previously undivided 
parcel."); see also Restatement (Third) of Property § 2.12 cmt. c (2000) (explaining that 
single ownership is the key element, not necessarily a single parcel). 
Moreover, it is not necessary that the unity of title be in the Harts or the Foxes. 
See Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (noting that 
unity of title had been in the parties' predecessor in interest).7 
Therefore, since the evidence reasonable favored a finding that unity of title 
existed prior to severance, the trial court did not err in finding that there had been unity of 
title of the two lots. 
7In Southland, this Court ultimately found that there was no easement by implication 
because one of the other elements was not met. Southland, 760 P.2d at 323. 
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B, The Servitude Was Apparent, Obvious, and Visible at the Time of 
Severance. 
It has long been the rule in Utah that "simultaneous sales or descents of two 
adjoining lots belonging to the same owner impress upon each lot the apparent and 
continuous servitudes which are in use over it at the time of the sale." Fayter v. North, 83 
P. 742, 747 (Utah 1906). 
The trial court found that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the 
time of severance. Specifically, the court found that, according to witnesses at trial, "a 
road (or 4-wheel drive trail, as some have called it) existed down the approximate center 
of the property" and that the road "was used extensively by the parties before construction 
and sat in essentially the same place as the common driveway sits today." [R. at 244.] 
The trial court specifically found that on the date of the severance, "[the Harts] and [the] 
Foxes were already using the road for their horses and both agreed that it was apparent, 
obvious, and visible." [Id.] 
The Schimmelpfennigs attempt to argue that, despite the trial court's finding, no 
servitude existed at the time of severance. However, instead of marshaling the evidence 
in support of the trial court's finding of fact, as required, the Schimmelpfennigs merely 
cite to parts of the transcript that they apparently think support their view. (See Aplt 
Brief at 28-30.) As noted above, this is impermissible. See Wayment 2006 UT 56, at % 
9; Boyington v. Glenn, 2002 UT App 194. Critically, the Schimmelpfennigs neglect to 
mention relevant portions of the testimony of Mr. Fox, who stated at trial (1) that there 
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was a dirt trail down the middle of the property prior to the parties' purchase of the lots 
[R. at 255 (137:20-138:16)]; (2) that the common driveway was "close" to the location of 
that trail [R. at 255 (138:21-139:6]; and (3) that in building an access road with fill, they 
put fill on top of the trail and continued to use a similar trail path [R. at 255 (165:8-22)]. 
This Court can affirm the finding of the trial court on that ground alone. 
Even if the Schimmelpfennigs had properly marshaled the evidence, the trial 
court's finding that there was an apparent, obvious, and visible servitude at the time of 
severance is not clearly erroneous. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's 
finding. 
C. The Easement Was Reasonably Necessary to the Enjoyment of the 
Dominant Estate, 
The trial court found that "[a]t all times relevant to this litigation, the common 
driveway and the road that preceded it were reasonable necessary to enjoy the dominant 
estate because in either form, the road has been the only access to the rear of the dominant 
estate." [R. at 244-45.] 
The Schimmelpfennigs disagree, arguing that the common driveway is not 
reasonably necessary for the Harts to enjoy their property because the Harts' property is 
not landlocked and it is allegedly otherwise accessible. (See Aplt. Brief at 31-34.) This 
argument is not supported by existing Utah case law. 
Under Utah law, only "reasonable" necessity is required to imply an easement. 
"Although some jurisdictions require absolute necessity, the Utah Supreme Court has 
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determined that 'the requirement of a reasonable necessity seems to be supported by the 
weight of authority and by reason,' and has, therefore, adopted this position." Butler. 774 
P.2dat 1154 (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1132 (Utah 1916)). In the Butler 
case, this Court rejected the same argument that the Schimmelpfennigs now 
make—namely, that an easement by implication "should not be inferred where there is 
alternative access to the land and improvements even if the alternative access is costly, 
inadequate, inconvenient or difficult, but may only be inferred where there is absolute 
necessity; i.e. only where one cannot get to his property through his own land." Butler, 
774 P.2d at 1154 (internal quotation omitted). On the contrary, it is clear that where 
alternate access is costly, inadequate, inconvenient, or difficult, such alternate access may 
not be "reasonable." Id. 
The court below rejected the Schimmelpfennigs' suggestion that it would be 
"reasonable" to require the Harts to alter their property by removing a retention pond, re-
landscaping, and installing and paving a new driveway. [R. at 245.] This determination 
was certainly within the discretion of the trial court judge, who had the opportunity to 
actually view and inspect the property in person during the course of the trial. [R. at 255 
(22:10-26:4).] This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's findings with regard to 
the reasonable necessity of the easement. 
D. The Use of the Easement Was Continuous Rather Than Sporadic. 
The trial court correctly found, and the Schimmelpfennigs do not dispute (see Aplt. 
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Brief at 34), that the Harts' use of the common driveway easement has been continuous. 
[R. at 245.] 
Because the trial court did not err in finding that each of the elements for an 
easement by implication were met, this Court should affirm the trial court's holding. 
IH. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE SCOPE OF THE 
EASEMENT COINCIDES WITH THE LOCATION OF THE 
COMMON DRIVEWAY WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The Schimmelpfennigs also nominally raise, in their statement of issues, the 
question of whether the trial court erred in finding that, even if an express easement were 
created, the easement "must remain substantially on the Schimmelpfennig property, rather 
than being equally located on the property of Schimmelpfennig and Hart." (See Aplt. 
Brief at 2.)8 However, a review of their brief does not disclose any argument on that 
point, although it is somewhat similar to their arguments that there is no express easement 
at all 
"It is well established that Utah appellate courts will not consider claims that are 
inadequately briefed." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f 8, 52 P.3d 467. Each 
"argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
8It is unclear to counsel for the Harts what, exactly, the Schimmelpfennigs mean by this, 
but counsel assumes that the Schimmelpfennigs are arguing that even if there is an express 
easement, it is in some location other than the existing common driveway. The Harts are unable 
to adequately respond, not knowing what location that might allegedly be. 
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Because the Schimmelpfennigs have set forth no argument, authority, or citations 
to the record with respect to this issue, this Court need not consider it. 
Even if the Court did consider the issue, it should nevertheless affirm the decision 
of the trial court. A trial court's findings of fact regarding the scope of an easement are 
reviewed "for clear error, granting the district court great deference in its review of the 
evidence.9' Dansie v. Hi Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n. 2004 UT App 149, f 7, 92 
P.3d 162. As explained above, the trial court found that an express easement, or in the 
alternative, an implied easement, was created in the common driveway. [R. at 242-45.] 
The Schimmelpfennigs have not demonstrated clear error in the trial court's underlying 
factual findings, nor have they shown that the trial court exceeded its broad discretion in 
applying those factual findings to the law. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Harts respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
trial court's December 19, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
DATED this 2 3 day of July, 2007. 
McKAY^BURTON 
John p. Morris 
Attorneys for Donald and Cindy Hart 
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